Ensuring Human Rights during the International Search of the Accused and Convicted within the Interpol
Abstract
The article reveals the international fugitives’ search procedure within the framework of the International Criminal Police Organization — Interpol, whose Charter has not been ratified by any state, but whose mechanisms allow detaining persons on the basis of an arrest warrant issued by a law enforcement agency of another state or on the basis of a «red» notice of such an organization. Interpol plays a purely informational role in this process. The issue of the detention of a person and his (her) subsequent extradition by the state in which he (she) is detained is decided independently and without the influence of Interpol.
It has been established that, despite the existence of several stages of verification of information about a person submitted for placement on the Interpol’s international wanted list, it is impossible to exclude the unreasonable use of this mechanism. It should be borne in mind that the person concerned may not even know that information about him (her) is in the Interpol database.
The current case pending before the EU Court of Justice (Case No. C-505/19), the decision on which may change the organization’s practice in the EU, is analyzed. In this case, the decision of the EU Court of Justice may reduce the possibilities of Interpol on the territory of this Union, and the ne bis in idem principle can indirectly go beyond the boundaries of the European integration entity.
The legal remedies used in relation to the information contained in the Interpol database, which can be divided into supranational and national, are identified. Taking into account the organization’s immunity from jurisdiction, except in cases usually provided for diplomatic missions, Interpol itself can be influenced solely through its internal Commission for the Control of INTERPOL’s Files. Remedies at the national level are more diverse. For example, in the country that initiated the search, it is possible to force the National Central Bureau (NCB), which sent a request for a «red» notice, to remove such information, or to appeal against an arrest warrant.
References
Barnett, M., Coleman, L. (2005) Designing Police: Interpol and the Study of Change in International Organizations. International Studies Quarterly, 49 (4), 593–619. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2478.2005.00380.x.
Samarin, V. I. (2004) Interpol. Mezhdunarodnaja organizacija ugolovnoj policii. SPb., Piter.
Sheptycki, J. (2004) The Accountability of Transnational Policing Institutions: The Strange Case of Interpol. Canadian Journal of Law and Society, 19 (1), 107–134. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0829320100007973.
Ovchinskij, V. S. (2001) Interpol (v voprosah i otvetah). Moskwa, Infra-M.
Interpol: 75 years of international police co-operation. 1998. London, Kensington Publications Ltd.
Savino, M. (2010) Global Administrative Law Meets «Soft» Powers: the Uncomfortable Case of Interpol Red Notices. Journal of International Law and Politics, 43 (2), 263–336.